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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the response of the State bank of Pakistan—the central bank, to 
foreign exchange inflows for the period of 2001:1 to 2006:8. In this context, we estimated 
sterilization and offset coefficients using vector autoregression (VAR) model to account 
for the issue of endogeneity of domestic credit with the foreign exchange interventions. 
In addition, the paper also analyzes the role of foreign and domestic interest rate 
differentials in pulling in or pushing out of these foreign exchange flows. We found that 
the offset coefficient is very small and insignificant (0.16) implying that changes in credit 
resulted in very minimal offsetting reserve flows. The study found out that for the sample 
period, SBP only partially sterilized the inflows with magnitude of coefficient at (0.50) 
confirming the stylized facts. Results also indicate that inflows were neither pulled into 
the country due to high domestic interest rates due to some domestic policy nor they are 
pushed into Pakistan owing to low interest rates abroad.  This paper also divided the 
sample in to two periods from 2001:1 to 2004:3 and 2004:4 to 2006:8.   
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I. Introduction 
Since 2000 the emerging economies have experienced a new surge in foreign exchange 
inflows followed by massive interventions by their central banks to prevent currency 
appreciation. Pakistan too experienced spurt in these inflows after September 11, 2001. In 
Pakistan’s case, this surge in foreign exchange inflows originated from an increase in aid 
and investment flows, and more importantly from the growth in workers’ remittances.  
This resulted in reversal of traditional market expectations of devaluation and 
accordingly rupee started to appreciate (see Figure 1).  The huge volume of inflows 
forced the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market to keep the parity 
between Rupee/US$ stable.1  Consequently, State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) purchased 
foreign exchange worth US$ 8.22 billion during the period July 2001 to March 2004. 
The conventional wisdom asserts that central banks can intervene in foreign exchange 
markets to resist currency appreciation for some time because there is no simple, clear 
ceiling to the volume of domestic currency they can sell in forex markets. Just as 
conservative is the view that extended, significant intervention must eventually weaken 
domestic macroeconomic performance presenting the central banks with a policy 
impasse. The main reason for policy dilemma is that intervention in the foreign exchange 
market has direct consequences for the stance of monetary policy. In general, the central 
bank would want both to resist currency appreciation and to control the inflationary 
pressures. If so, injection of liquidity due to foreign exchange intervention would be in 
direct conflict with monetary policy of the country. To accomplish both its monetary and 
exchange rate targets, the central banks usually resort to sterilized intervention in the 
foreign exchange market.2  Regardless of exchange rate regime, sterilized intervention 
may be viewed as an attempt to attain independent external and internal targets in short 
                                                 
1 Since there was large inflows from US and Europe from expat Pakistanis, it was feared that these are one 
off transfers and as soon as the situation get better in US and Europe, these inflows would shrink 
substantially. Therefore to shield the external sector from this perceived volatility in exchange rate, SBP 
intervened in the market.  
2 Sterilized intervention is a combination of two transactions.  First the central bank conducts a non-
sterilized intervention by buying foreign currency with home currency.  This results in the increase in 
monetary base.  Then the central bank sterilizes the effect on monetary base by selling a corresponding 
quantity of home currency denominated bonds to soak up the initial increase in the monetary base. 
[Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) chapter8] 
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run. For this to be possible, domestic and foreign assets must be imperfect substitutes in 
private portfolio [Obstfeld (1982a).    
In the case of Pakistan, the monetary authority too, was confronted with conflicting goals 
as foreign exchange inflows continuously poured into the country. According to State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP) annual report FY01, page 3 “ on the one hand there was an 
urgent need to shift government borrowings from SBP to banks and to insulate the Rupee 
from excessive volatility—this placed upward pressure on T-bill rates. On the other hand, 
efforts to increase private sector investment, ease the government’s debt burden, and 
contain the impact of our commitment to link export finance rates to T-bill rates pushed 
in the opposite direction.” This clearly entailed for SBP to decide on the extent of 
sterilization.  
Thus, the challenge the monetary authority faces is to coordinate intervention with 
monetary policy.  Therefore, in this paper we investigate empirically the questions of the 
need for and the success of sterilization efforts of State Bank of Pakistan by estimating 
sterilization coefficient. We also gauged the offset coefficient which measures the extent, 
to which capital flows offset policy induced changes in monetary base. More specifically 
it provides a useful summary measure of the scope for a domestically oriented monetary 
policy. Furthermore, we will analyze the role of foreign and domestic interest rate 
differentials in pulling in or pushing out of these foreign exchange flows.   
Figure1: Foreign Reserves Accumulation and Nominal Exchange Rate
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This paper is organized as follows. Following section gives us some backdrop of the 
issue. Section III consists of literature review. Section IV describes the theoretical 
framework we will be using while section V explains empirical results. Paper is 
concluded in section VI.   
II. Backdrop 
Nineties was a difficult decade for Pakistan economy. Economic growth slowed down 
due to various factors namely: political uncertainties, weather calamities and structural 
constraints.  This situation further deteriorated in late nineties when Pakistan went 
nuclear and attracted economic sanctions from the international community.  However, it 
was the external sector of the economy that suffered the most.  The significant foreign 
exchange inflows of 1980s dried down after the end of Afghan war against USSR.  That 
put the economic system of the country under severe strain.  In the mean time, rising 
current account deficit that resulted from increase in domestic absorption and loss of 
competitiveness due to overvalued rupee caused fall in international reserves. 
Consequently, the central bank was forced to frequently devalue domestic currency 
during nineties in order to correct current account imbalances (see Table A for selected 
economic indicators at the end of paper). 3    
After enduring a painful decade of low growth and contractionary demand management 
policies, Pakistan’s economic performance since 2000 could be characterized as 
satisfactory. Fiscal deficit was contained within limit, inflation was low, and foreign 
exchange accumulation was satisfactory. In short, macroeconomic fundamentals were 
back on track. As part of stabilization program, Pakistan’s central bank allowed a free 
float for its currency and dismantled the Rupee band that had been in place during FY00.  
As a result rupee depreciated by 23.8 percent during the year. Consequently trade deficit 
fell. In order to augment its reserves, the SBP purchased US$ 2157 million from kerb 
market. Instead of direct intervention and moving the Rupee/Dollar band, monetary 
policy was the main tool to quell episodes of speculation in foreign exchange market and 
to smooth out the volatility caused by lumpy payments.   
                                                 
3 See Janjua (2004), History of The State Bank of Pakistan 1988-2003 Chapter 7 for more details.  
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Post September 11, 2001; Pakistan experienced large inflows of foreign exchange and a 
resulting build up of foreign reserves and appreciation of the real exchange rate (see 
Figure 2).  It would seem that external factors played a crucial role in brining home these 
foreign exchange inflows. Most noteworthy was the big upsurge in workers’ remittances 
through official channels that resulted from the global crack down on illegal channels of 
money transfer. This led to the collapse of Hundi system and demise of kerb market 
premium over official rate. Another contributing factor was the reverse capital flight as 
the balances of Pakistani’s came under scrutiny abroad.  In addition, debt rescheduling 
and new large aid inflows to Pakistan for siding with US and its allies in the war against 
Al Qaeda augmented the net inflows (see Table 1 of non-debt creating inflows).   
The tremendous improvement in Pakistan’s external sector post September 2001, either 
directly or indirectly, contributed to positive developments for many macroeconomic 
indicators.4  For instance, workers’ remittances almost doubled during FY02 in 
comparison with previous year to reach at US$ 2.39 billion. Together with increased 
official transfers, these inflows allowed SBP to augment its foreign exchange reserves 
and therefore perhaps a need to sterilize its impact on base money. Moreover, the current 
account recorded a surplus and underpinned the 6.2 percent appreciation of Pakistan 
                                                 
4 This was attributed to a reversal of capital flight, as Pakistani balances held outside came under increased 
scrutiny from host countries and then increasingly waning attraction of foreign exchange holdings due to 
appreciating rupee.   
Figure 2: Index of Real Exchange Rate (WPI based)
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Rupee.  Indeed the purchases allowed the SBP to stabilize the Exchange rate.  The 
rationale for SBP intervention in foreign exchange market for slowing down of rupee 
appreciation was the fear that this upsurge in inflows might be temporary.  In short, while 
FY01 SBP foreign exchange net purchases were to support Rupee, the FY02 buying was 
essentially to prevent it from strengthening too sharply.5   
Table 1: Non-debt creating inflows 
 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 
Non-debt creating 13,794 14,534 16,693 19,581 20,772 24,212 28,851 
As a percentage of total 
inflows 0.82 0.73 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.74 0.71 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan       
Furthermore the rupee liquidity injected through the foreign exchange purchases enabled 
SBP to ease its monetary policy which was contrary to FY01 when monetary policy was 
kept tight to support Rupee.  Interestingly however, SBP reserve money growth was 
contained to only 9.6 percent, as injections through SBP foreign exchange purchases 
were sterilized by a net retirement of SBP’s government securities holdings.  The process 
of SBP-NDA reduction was particularly very intriguing, as the increased market liquidity 
(against SBP intervention) was neutralized without actually pursuing any explicit 
instrument for sterilization.  Specifically, while most of the increased market liquidity 
was being channeled to the government securities, the government was retiring SBP debt 
using borrowings from commercial banks.  This resulted into a reduction of SBP-NDA.  
Hence, what seems to be a shift in domestic debt structure of the government actually 
helped the SBP’s efforts to restrict monetary base expansion.6  
In a sense, the sterilization pursued by SBP is not very different from open market 
operations: while this process shifts the SBP holdings of government securities to 
commercial banks indirectly, the open market operation achieves similar results directly.  
Looking at sterilization during FY02, the retirement of Rs 287 billion worth of 
government securities with SBP more than offset the impact of SBP intervention in the 
                                                 
5 In FY01, the SBP foreign exchange purchases were being injected into the interbank market to lower 
volatility and meet lumpy payments.  The SBP was net seller in interbank market during FY01.  
6 The practice of sterilization had cost for SBP in terms of foregone interest earning on government 
securities etc.  In addition, this could have increased quasi fiscal cost for government.  However, low 
private sector credit demand left ample liquidity with the banks resulting in switch of government debt 
from SBP to banks without putting much pressure on interest. However we ignore this discussion here 
because it is not in the scope of this paper.   
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foreign exchange market.  Consequently, as mentioned above, the reserve money growth 
was held down to 9.6 percent despite sizeable foreign exchange purchases by SBP.7   
The FY03 too witnessed current account surplus owing to reduction in trade deficit and 
phenomenal increase in worker remittances to US$ 4237 million.  SBP intervened 
heavily to stabilize the Rupee/Dollar parity by not letting it to appreciate too quickly.  
Indeed we can characterize this policy to be a pseudo free float, as SBP never allowed the 
Rupee to move freely.  The SBP in its Annual report for FY03 page 7 conceded that 
exchange rate practically acted as a nominal anchor for the monetary policy, which was 
discount rate during previous year.  In contrast to FY02 position, when SBP essentially 
mopped up rupee liquidity resulting from its forex market interventions, FY03 saw a very 
deliberate reduction in these sterilization operations, despite a sharper rise in forex 
purchases (See SBP Annual Report FY03, page 3).  This resulting liquidity flooding the 
banking system raised competitive pressures and led directly to fall in interest rates.  As a 
result of low sterilization effort, reserve money grew by 14.5 percent without resulting in 
inflationary pressures, which can be attributed to lags in inflation dynamics.   
During FY04, although net forex inflows declined relatively, the SBP continued with its 
loose monetary stance. In fact net credit to private sector grew by Rupee 325 billion, 
which was more than twice the cumulative net credit expansion in preceding three years. 
The negative of this expansionary policy was the rise of inflationary expectation.  
Headline inflation measured with CPI recorded at 4.6 percent.  This coupled with the 
reduction in unilateral inflows of foreign exchange put pressure on Rupee to depreciate.8  
As stated in SBP annual report FY04, page 9; “in fact the depreciation in Rupee would 
have been even steeper had the central bank not defended the rupee aggressively,…”.9  
All of these resulted in the upward pressure on interest rates.  With relatively low inflows 
and deliberate expansionary monetary policy, sterilization effort was on the lower side. 
As the governor of the SBP stated “Despite some mopping up, the Central Bank has left 
excess liquidity with the banks which has driven down the cost of credit to historically 
low levels of 5 percent average. The banks are, therefore, reaching out to new customers 
                                                 
7 See SBP Annual Report for FY02.   
8 Saudi oil facility ended this year. 
9 State Bank of Pakistan was a net seller of foreign exchange since April 2004 (see Figure 3) 
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particularly the middle and lower income groups by providing them agriculture credit, 
SME loans, mortgage loans and consumer loans. This is the most direct way the reserve 
accumulation is benefiting the common man….”10 
However, with inflation peaking at 9.3 percent, SBP had to switch to tightening of 
monetary stance during FY05.  This shift in policy was more pronounced during second 
half of the FY05, with the benchmark 6-month T-bill yield rising by 416 basis points 
during this period, as against 166 basis points increase in first half of the same year.  
However, despite this rise in interest rates monetary growth remained high at 19.3 
percent.  Current account deficit was recorded at US$ 1.4 billion, which stemmed mainly 
from trade deficit of US$6.2 billion during the year.  However, worker remittances of 
US$4.0 billion helped finance this deficit.  On net basis SBP was a seller of foreign 
exchange in market.  This aggressive selling was to defend the rupee from falling.  
Throughout the year, SBP remained an active player in forex market.   
III. Literature Review 
                                                 
10 A paper presented at Pakistan Administrative Staff College on March 11, 2004 by Dr. Ishrat Hussain, 
Governor, State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
Figure 3: Net Foreign exchange purchases
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Central bank intervention following foreign exchange inflows has direct implications for 
the stance of monetary policy. Generally, the central bank would want both to resist 
currency appreciation and to control inflationary pressures. If so, foreign exchange 
intervention would be in direct conflict with monetary policy of the country and the 
monetary authorities will find it harder to prevent appreciation pressure while at the same 
time raising the interest rate. Thus, a first challenge the monetary authority faces is to 
coordinate intervention with monetary policy. This is achieved through sterilization. But 
the close coordination with monetary policy that sterilized intervention assumes may not 
be easy to achieve in practice. In particular, intervention to resist appreciation might 
confuse the market when the central bank is raising interest rates to fight inflationary 
pressure. There is a danger that exchange rate policy might dominate monetary policy. In 
addition, Truman (2003) raises the concern about distraction risk which means that the 
authorities might be tempted to postpone fundamental adjustments hoping that 
intervention will succeed. He shows that during the late 1970s intervention against a 
weak dollar was primarily used as a substitute for monetary tightening in the United 
States. But the delay in tightening monetary policy eventually led to a sharp rise in 
inflation and the need to raise interest rates to a very high level. The tighter monetary 
policy, in turn, led to one of the worst recessions in US postwar history. 
In view of these challenges, many economists have argued that intervention should be 
restricted to cases where it is consistent with the central bank’s inflation forecast. For 
instance, intervention to resist depreciation should be accompanied by the forecast that 
inflation would - if depreciation occurred - rise above the target during the targeting 
horizon. Conversely, the central bank would intervene to resist appreciation only when 
inflation is forecast to fall below the target. Holub (2004) argues that in the Czech 
Republic such coordination has been maintained since the introduction of inflation 
targeting in 1998: most interventions against currency appreciation were carried out when 
(a) inflation was expected to fall below the target and (b) the output gap was negative. 
A second question concerns the ability of monetary authorities to conduct sterilized 
intervention on a sustained basis. What are the limits to sterilized intervention? At least 
three major impediments have been discussed in the literature.  
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The first is the issue of the impossible trinity which asserts that with no capital controls, 
the central bank cannot indefinitely control both the nominal exchange rate and the 
money market rate. This is the classic argument of Mundell (1968). In the case of 
intervention to prevent depreciation, such a limit will be often set by the reserves and 
contingency credit lines available to a country. Depleting reserves, at some stage, will 
make an interest rate increase inevitable. The limit on intervention to prevent 
appreciation is, however, less clear cut because reserves can keep rising. When the 
exchange rate is fixed and capital is mobile, the central problem of monetary 
management is the endogeneity of home money supply. Domestic credit expansion aimed 
at affecting internal markets cause an incipient weakening of exchange rate. To maintain 
the official parity, the central bank must intervene in the foreign exchange market by 
buying high-powered money with foreign reserves. In this manner, attempts to alter the 
domestic source component of the monetary base are hindered, even in the short run, by 
offsetting movements in its foreign source component. If the offset to domestic credit 
expansion is complete, the monetary base is determined independently of the central 
bank’s policies by the saving and portfolio decisions of the public. The central bank can 
affect the monetary base only when domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes. 
If there is perfect substitutability, the net foreign assets offset to domestic credit measures 
is immediate and complete, provided there are no lags in portfolio adjustments [Obstfeld 
(1982a)]. When the exchange rate is flexible, the level of exchange rate is determined by 
the supply and demand of currency. In this system, the nominal money supply becomes a 
policy determined variable and as in the fixed exchange rate, the central bank can attain 
independent monetary management only if there is imperfect substitutability between 
domestic and foreign assets. 
Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) argued, however, that resisting currency 
appreciation would prevent the domestic money market interest rate from falling, attract 
more inflows and thus continuously increase the need for sterilization. Eventually, the 
cost of sterilization would rise to high levels, leading either the interest rate to fall or the 
exchange rate to appreciate. Therefore according to them, sterilization is difficult and 
costly. In the long run, therefore, appreciation becomes unavoidable because even in the 
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case of a fall in interest rate and the resulting increase in inflation will lead to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
In fact, large-scale sterilized intervention had previously led to sharp increases in short-
term interest rates - particularly in countries with a history of inflation. Reinhart and 
Reinhart (1999) document evidences during the early 1990s. In Chile the short-term 
interest rate (30- to 89-day bank lending rate) rose from about 28% in the period (1988-
89) preceding capital inflows to over 46% during the period (January to July 1990) of 
heavy inflows and sterilization. The rise in interest rates was as dramatic in Colombia, 
with prime lending rates of banks more than doubling from 22% during the pre-inflow 
period (1989-90) to over 47% during the peak of sterilization (January to November 
1991). Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) conclude that “sterilization policies were either 
abandoned or scaled back or complemented by capital controls, as it became evident that 
the high domestic interest rates were attracting more inflows”. 
Reisen (1993), however, argued that sterilization is easier. He asserts that some Asian 
countries have been able to achieve the impossible trinity of open financial markets, fixed 
exchange rates and the monetary independence.  
Frankel (1994) examines the issue of foreign exchange inflows and the ability of the 
monetary authorities to conduct sterilized intervention. He concludes that sterilization is 
expensive when the cause of the capital inflows is a rise in money demand or an increase 
in exports. Attempts to sterilize such inflows would raise interest rates, leading to even 
larger inflows, thereby rendering the sterilization practice as difficult and expensive. On the 
other hand, when the source of foreign exchange inflows is an external shock, sterilized 
intervention is not likely to alter the interest rates and hence it can be a viable option in 
the short run. 
Secondly, imperfect substitutability among assets means that changes in the supplies of 
such assets as a result of sterilization affect relative prices. Classic models e.g. Argy and 
Murray (1985) typically assume that the central bank sells domestic bonds to sterilize. If 
domestic bonds (whose yield carries a risk premium) are imperfect substitutes of foreign 
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bonds, the authorities would have to pay higher interest rates on their sterilization bonds 
to encourage bondholders to switch out of foreign bonds.  
Finally, the high costs of issuing high-yield local currency debt to acquire low-yielding 
reserves can exacerbate fiscal deficits and so threaten macroeconomic stability. This can 
be particularly serious in countries that already have large public sector debts. In some 
circumstances, the combination of high costs and increasing reserves may provide a 
signal to markets that policy is on an unsustainable path and so accentuate destabilizing 
capital flows. 
Calvo (1991) argued that such effects would eventually weaken central banks’ anti-
inflation credibility by raising the probability of debt monetization and high inflation. 
Comparing the high interest rate differentials of Chile and Colombia with Argentina, 
which followed a policy of non-sterilized intervention during the early 1990s, Calvo et al 
(1993), cast serious doubts on the desirability of sterilized intervention because it raised 
debt service costs at a time when countries were attempting to bring domestic debt 
expansion under control.  
In short, various possible consequences of sterilizing prolonged or very large 
interventions could be that it could undermine monetary objectives; it could compromise 
financial stability; and it could impose heavy financing costs on the monetary authorities.  
Despite the possibility of these consequences and the concerns about coordination 
between intervention and monetary policy, monetary authorities do engage in sterilized 
intervention in the foreign exchange market.  Since, failure to sterilize market 
intervention and the consequent increase in domestic liquidity can result in inflation as 
well as unwanted movement in exchange rate. In addition, the real exchange rate is also 
influenced by the ability of central banks to sterilize. Under these circumstances, 
determining the offset and sterilization coefficients of the central bank could be useful in 
terms of measuring of the scope and the stance of the monetary policy. Indeed, this issue 
has discussed in the literature by several authors.11  
                                                 
11 Offset coefficient indicates the fraction of any domestic credit expansion reversed by central bank 
foreign reserve losses in the same period while sterilization coefficient indicates that the degree of 
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Kouri and Porter (1974) and Obstfeld (1982a) pointed out that the offset coefficient is 
subject to a possible sterilization bias.12  The source of the bias is the possible 
endogeneity of changes in NDA, when central bank follows a sterilization policy.  If 
capital inflow is systematically sterilized, the change in NDA will be correlated with the 
disturbance term in the NFA equation (or capital-flow equation), therefore OLS estimates 
will be inconsistent.  To remedy this problem, Argy and Kouri (1972) suggested that the 
offset and sterilization equations be estimated by two-stage least squares using 
instrumental variables.13 They found evidence of partial sterilization on part of Germany 
and the Netherlands, but inconclusive evidence for Italy.   
Kouri and Porter (1974) developed a model of international capital flows and applied it to 
the data of Germany, The Netherlands, Australia and Italy.  The offset coefficient which 
measures the extent, to which capital flows offset policy induced changes in monetary 
base, were statistically significant in all cases.  The estimates were -0.77 for Germany, -
0.59 for Netherlands, -0.47 for Australia, and -0.43 for Italy.  All these estimates are 
statistically different from minus one, which suggested that sterilization was possible in 
these countries at least in short run. 
Miller and Askin (1976) examines the degree to which the balance of payment of two 
small, relatively open economies influence the ability of their monetary authorities to 
control the money supply.  More specifically, they investigate to what extent variations in 
the domestic components of monetary base are offset via international payment 
imbalances, and then to what extent the authorities sterilize the effect of payments 
imbalances on monetary base.  They built a simple model that incorporates the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments for Brazil and Chile.  They used the reduced-form 
solutions and two stage-least square regressions to tackle the issues of simultaneity 
between (a) changes in the international and domestic components of the monetary base 
                                                                                                                                                 
sterilization which is offset in the inflows so as to leave the overall money supply unaffected through open 
market operations or some other monetary regulations like reserve requirements etc. 
 
12The offset coefficient measures the extent to which capital flows offset policy induced changes in 
monetary base.  It explains the changes in foreign exchange reserves (NFA) due to the variations in net 
domestic assets (NDA).   
13 For detailed discussion on sterilization bias, see Obstfeld (1982)a. 
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and (b) the level of income and the monetary base.  The empirical results concluded that 
only a relatively small portion of changes in domestic component of monetary base was 
offset through the balance of payments while authorities completely sterilized the impact 
of payments imbalance on monetary base. Their results suggest that the monetary 
authority in these countries had almost complete control over money supply.  However, 
Sheehey (1980) used an alternative specification of Miller and Askin (1976) model and 
suggested a limited ability of monetary authorities to influence the money supply. 
Kamas (1986) used a reduced form equation derived from a general macroeconomic 
model. Kamas made estimations in the context of three different specifications: the 
monetarist, the portfolio balance, and Keynesian for the period of 1971:03 to 1981:4 for 
Mexico and for the period of 1970:4 to 1982:04 for Venezuela.  The offset coefficient for 
varied from 0.04 to 0.09 for Mexico and from -0.65 to -0.82 for Venezuela. The 
sterilization coefficient came out to be 1.55 and -1.04 respectively for both countries.  
Altınkemer (1997) estimates the domestic credit reaction function of Central Bank of 
Turkey (CBRT) by dividing the estimation period into two sub-periods, February 1990-
October 1993 and April 1994-June 1997. Study concludes that, during the pre-financial 
crisis period, it seems that the CBRT was reacting to changes in net foreign assets (NFA), 
real exchange rate and not to interest differential. While in the post financial crisis period, 
it seems that the CBRT reacted more to NFA changes compared to the pre-crisis period 
and also interest rate differentials gained importance in the monetary policy framework. 
The sterilization coefficients have been found as 0.82 and 0.91 for the first and second 
periods respectively by using OLS. 
Another study for Turkey on the same subject by Celasun et al, (1999) computed the 
sterilization coefficients.  They estimated Net Domestic Assets (NDA) by using two-
stage least squares, for the period February 1990 to June 1996, wherein the reaction 
function allows net domestic assets to respond to other variables, such as, net foreign 
assets, real exchange rate, real GDP and consolidated government deficit.14 For the whole 
                                                 
14 NDA including revaluation account and adjusted for reserve requirements.  Government Deficit 
including instrumental variables; constant, monthly dummies, three lags of the dependent and conditioning 
variables, 6 lags of net foreign assets, uncovered interest parity and three lags of it. 
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period, the sterilization coefficient was found as (-) 0.37, which indicated partial 
sterilization of 37 percent of reserve inflows (given that lags of NFA proved 
insignificant). 
Emir et al (2000) estimated monetary policy reaction function for Turkey and calculated 
the offset and sterilization coefficient using simultaneous equation system for the periods 
of 1990 to 1993 and 1995 to 1999. The results showed that in the first period which is the 
pre-crisis period (1990-1993), low degree of sterilization, offset and neutralization 
coefficients, which suggest that the CBRT implemented a relatively accommodative 
policy to fiscal policy by expanding domestic credits to finance budget deficit. In 
contrast, in the second period which is the post-crisis period (1995-1999), the CBRT 
implemented more active policy by sterilizing most of the foreign assets increase and 
neutralizing the government credits by reducing the banking sector credits which was 
reflected in the high level of sterilization, offset and neutralization coefficient.  
Siklos (2000) focused on short run impact of sterilization on monetary policy and found 
that Central Bank of Hungary (NBH) fully sterilized capital inflows during 1992:01 to 
1997:03 and the sterilization coefficient thus found was 1.002 by using OLS method. 
In other studies on the issues, Renhack and Mondino (1988) and Clavijo (1986) for 
Colombia; Blejer and Leiderman (1981) for Brazil; Fry, Lilien and Wadhwa (1991) for 
Pacific Basin Countries; Savvides (1998) for West and Central African countries, the 
offset and the sterilization coefficients were estimated to measure the degree of monetary 
independence or performance of monetary policy.  
Patnaik (2004) used error correction procedure to analyze the sterilization practice of 
Reserve bank of India (RBI) using monthly data for period April 1993 to December 
2003.  The result suggests that RBI directly sterilized its currency intervention by a 
reduction in net domestic assets. However, though the extent of sterilization was large, it 
was not complete. The offset coefficient is estimated to be -0.8. 
Korea witnessed surge in capital inflows and improvement in current account in early 
90s.  During this period, Bank of Korea actively intervened into the foreign exchange 
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market and offset the monetary impact of foreign exchange interventions through 
sterilization.  Kim (1991) estimated 90 percent sterilization of increase in net foreign 
assets during the 1980s. 
Cavoli and Rajan (2005) estimated sterilization coefficients for Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines for the monthly observation for the period January 
1990 to March 1997. The estimates for Korea (-1.11) suggest possible over-sterilization 
as the coefficient exceeds -1 and those for Indonesia are lower than the others at -0.76. 
The estimates for Thailand (-0.91), Malaysia (-0.94) and Philippines (-0.97) suggests 
almost complete sterilization of inflows.  
Qayyum and Khan (2003 used the domestic policy reaction function to gauge the degree 
of sterilization by investigating the long run relationship for Pakistan.  They used 
quarterly data from 1982Q3 to 2001Q2 and concluded that State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) 
did sterilize 72 percent of capital inflows for the period.  Asad et al. (2005) studied the 
degree of sterilization by using the monthly data for the period of July 2007 to December 
2003.  They used OLS technique and their estimated sterilization coefficient was -0.87. 
This study for Pakistan is different from previous studies as it focuses on the current 
episode of inflows that SBP encountered after 2001.  In addition, contrary to this study, 
none of the previous studies focused on offset coefficient or tried to focus on the causes 
of inflows.  Also the data is handled with more care in this paper. Furthermore, by using 
the VAR, this study tackled the issue of endogeneity of domestic credit with the foreign 
exchange interventions.   
IV. Theoretical Framework 
In order to understand and interpret the relation between inflows, sterilization and SBP’s 
monetary policy conduct, we will use the theoretical model developed by Kouri and 
Porter (1974). This model is augmented by monetary policy reaction function in line with 
Obstfeld (1982b).15  The sterilization and offset coefficients are calculated. The basic 
assumptions of the model are fixed exchange rate, small country, and wages and prices 
                                                 
15 Similar techenique was used by Christensen (2004) for the Czech Republic. 
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are assumed as given.  Also the balance of current account is exogenous. Small country 
assumption implies that domestic demand of foreign asset is small relative to world 
supply.  Any change in domestic bond does not affect the price of these assets.  It is also 
assumed that foreigners can only hold domestic bonds not domestic currency.   
Assumptions: 
− Fixed exchange rate. 
− Small country assumption: Domestic policy actions do not affect foreign wealth 
and interest rates. 
− Fixed prices: Wages and prices are given. 
− Exogenous Current Account (CA): The balance on the current account is 
predetermined. 
− Infinite supply of foreign assets: The small country assumption implies a 
relatively small size of domestic demand compared to world supply. Any change 
in domestic demand for foreign bond does not affect the price of these bonds. 
− Foreign acquisition of domestic assets: Foreigners can only hold domestic bonds 
(i.e. not domestic money) 
Demand for base money  
(1)   ( , , , )DM L Y W id if=  where , 0; , 0y w id ifL L L L> <  
Net domestic demand for domestic bonds 
(2)  ( , , , )DB H Y W id if=  where , 0; 0; 0id w if yH H H H> < ><  
Domestic demand for foreign bonds 
(3)  ( , , , )FB J Y W id if= where , 0; 0; 0if w id yJ J J J> < ><  
Net foreign demand for domestic bonds 
(4)  * * *( , , , )DB J Y W id if=  where * *0, 0, , 0id if w yH H H H> < ><  
Total money supply 
(5)  NDANFAM s +=  
Domestic component of money supply 
(6)  GBNDA Δ−=Δ which represents open market operation 
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Foreign components of money supply 
(7)  CABKNFA +=Δ  
Total net capital inflows 
(8)  FD BBK Δ−Δ= *  
Domestic wealth constraint 
(9)  WJHL =++ (...)(...)(...)  
Money equilibrium 
(10)  sD MM =  
Domestic bond equilibrium 
(11)  GDD BBB =+ *  
Endogenous variables: 
=DM Money Demand, =sM Money Supply, id =Domestic Interest Rates, =DB  Net 
Domestic Demand For Domestic Bonds, =FB  Domestic Demand For Foreign Bonds, 
=*DB  Net Foreign Demand For Domestic Bonds, =NFA Net Foreign Assets of the 
Central Bank, =K  Total Net Capital Inflows 
Exogenous variables: 
=*,YY Domestic and Foreign Nominal Income, =*,WW  Domestic and Foreign 
Nominal Wealth , if = Foreign Interest Rate, =GB Stock of Government Bonds held by 
Private Sector, =NDA Net Domestic Assets of the Central Bank, =CAB Current 
Account Balance. 
The model can be solved for changes in domestic interest rates and changes in net foreign 
assets (NFA) of the central bank (see appendix).  
(16)  
* *
* *
1 { ( )
( )
}
y w if if
id id
y w
id H Y H W F H if
F H
NDA F Y F W CAB
Δ = − Δ + Δ + + Δ ++
Δ + Δ + Δ +
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and  
(17)  
* *
* *
1[ { ( ) }]
( )
1[ { ( ) }]
( )
1[ { ( ) ( }]
( )
1[ ( )]
( )
1[ { }]
( )
y id id id y
id id
w id id id w
id id
if id id id if if
id id
id id
id id
id id idy w
id id
NFA L J F L J Y
F H
L J F L J W
F H
L J F L F J if
F H
F J NDA
F H
L F Y L F W L CAB
F H
Δ = − − − Δ ++
− − − Δ ++
− − + − Δ+
− − Δ ++
− Δ + Δ ++
 
 
The offset coefficient is defined as the partial derivative of changes in NFA with respect 
to changes in NDA. 
 
That is i i
i i
F JNFA
NDA F H
−Δ = −Δ +  where 1 0
NFA
NDA
Δ− ≤ ≤Δ  
The offset coefficient is often taken as the measure of monetary independence and a 
measure of capital mobility. There is a large degree of monetary independence, when 
offset coefficient is close to zero.  On the other hand monetary independence is small 
when it is close to -1, which implies that a a change in domestic credit is completely 
offset by a corresponding change in opposite direction in the international reserves, 
leaving the domestic stock of money unchanged.  
The model can be made more realistic by incorporating monetary authority reaction 
function [Obstfeld (1982)b] to the system comprising equations (16) and (17).   
(18)  NDA b NFA ZΔ = Δ + Δ   
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where Z is the vector of exogenous variables relevant to monetary policy such as 
inflation, foreign interest rates, output and current account etc.  The coefficient b  is the 
coefficient of sterilization which ranges between 0 and -1.  Full sterilization ( 1)b = −  
means  that domestic money supply is independent of net inflows of foreign exchange. 
Under such circumstances, domestic money supply is independent of balance of payment 
swings and is entirely determined by the exogenous factors Z .16 On the other hand, 
0b = implies that any change in NFA will entirely be reflected in MB.  
Empirical questions, Econometric methodology and data issues: 
The preceding section examined the theoretical relationship between capital flows, 
domestic interest rates, and sterilization policies.  Using the equations as the basic 
framework, the following questions about the experience and monetary policy 
management of capital inflows in the case of Pakistan can be raised.  The first question is 
to what extent monetary authority maintained monetary independence in its attempt to 
insulate the money supply from the surge in foreign exchange inflows during the period 
under consideration.  This question is examined by estimating the offset coefficient.  The 
high degree of monetary independence means that a limited amount of capital flows will 
be recorded in the wake of monetary changes.   
A second, and related question, is to what extent foreign or internal factors pushed or 
pulled foreign capital to Pakistan, respectively.  This question relates to the [Frankel( 
1994)] conclusion that unnecessarily high domestic interest rates will prevail when 
sterilization is undertaken in the case of an internal shock such as higher domestic money 
demand or increase in exports (pull factor).  On the other hand, sterilization will be more 
appropriate when capital is pushed by some external shock.  The empirical model 
contains a relation for foreign reserves to answer these two questions. 
A third question is whether monetary policy became endogenous to keep money supply 
constant.  In other words, given the significant foreign exchange inflows, the State Bank 
of Pakistan may have responded by tightening the domestic credit. If this was indeed the 
                                                 
16 This can be shown as 
( 1)MB NDA NFA MB b NFA Z NFA MB Z if bΔ = Δ + Δ ⇒ Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ ⇒ Δ = Δ = −… …  
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case, domestic credit will be endogenous in the relation of the foreign reserves, which 
will give rise to sterilization bias. The sterilization bias arises if the sterilization 
parameter, b, is significant, implying that the authorities systematically varied domestic 
credit in response to foreign exchange inflows. The failure to account for such a policy in 
single equation regression, where the endogenous domestic credit component is treated as 
exogenous, would give rise to biased estimates.  In order to avoid this problem, the 
econometric model should allow for domestic credit to be endogenous. 
Therefore, a VAR is estimated, containing domestic credit, domestic interest rates, and 
foreign reserves as endogenous variables.  In order to examine whether the foreign 
interest rates pushed foreign exchange inflow to Pakistan, it was included as an 
exogenous variable in the system. This system can be represented as following17 
(19) 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
k k k k k k
t i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i t
i i i i i i
k k k k k k
t i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i t
i i i i i i
t
i
DC DC R id if inf cam
R DC R id if inf cam
id
α β γ δ η λ ε
α β γ δ η λ ε
− − − − − −
= = = = = =
− − − − − −
= = = = = =
=
Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + + +
Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + + +
Δ =
Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ
Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ
3 3 3 3 1 1 3
1 1 1 1 1 1
k k k k k k
i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i t
i i i i i
DC R id if inf camα β γ δ η λ ε− − − − − −
= = = = =
Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + + +Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ
 
Where idΔ  is the change in domestic interest rates, ifΔ is change in foreign interest 
rates.  inf  is year on year inflation rate using monthly data. cam  is the first difference 
of  current account balance divided by MB. Foreign reserves of the SBP are used as 
proxy for Net Foreign Assets (NFA) of the SBP. RΔ  is the change in the foreign 
exchange reserves of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). Because exchange rate 
fluctuations entail changes in domestic currency valuation of reserves which are not 
reflected as a change in monetary base, the measure RΔ  excludes the periodic reserve 
valuation adjustment due to change in exchange rate.  RΔ  is constructed as following.   
                                                 
17 System includes the constant term. 
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(20)  [ * ( ) ]1 1 1R R ER R R ERt t t t t t= + −− − −  
(21)  [ * ( ) ]/1 1 1R R ER R R ER MBt t t t t tΔ = Δ + −− − −  
where tER is t period exchange rate of domestic currency for 1 unit of foreign currency. 
DCΔ  is taken as proxy for NDAΔ .  DC  is constructed by deducting tR  of equation 
(20) from monetary base ( MB ) according to the method of Leiderman (1984).  
(22)  ( 1)[ ]/t tDC DC DC MB−Δ = −  
However, the change in net domestic assets does not provide a complete picture of the 
stance of the domestic credit policy of the central bank.  The variation in reserve 
requirements on banks has important implications in domestic credit expansion.  The 
change in domestic credit DCΔ  should therefore be defined as the increase in net 
domestic assets minus the reserve impounded by any increase in required reserves. 
Following [Obstfeld(1982b)], this later component is calculated as following. 
  ( 1) ( 1)[ ] 2t t tRREQ RREQ M− −−  
However, since there is no change in reserve requirement during the period understudy 
(2001:1 to 2006:8) except the July 2006, we decided not to adjust the data for this (see 
Table E of Changes in Cash Reserve Requirement by SBP).   
Foreign interest rate is the average of 6-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate and 6-
Month Libor and denoted by if .  Domestic interest rates id are the 6-Month Treasury 
bill Rate. Variable for current account balance ( )CAM is constructed as follows; 
  ( 1)( ) /t tCAM CAB CAB MB−= −  
Inflation variable ( )INF is calculated using monthly CPI on year on year basis. Data on 
Industrial Production Index ( )IPI  is taken from FBS publications to proxy the real 
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sector activity. 18 Data on monetary base, interest rates, and ( )REER  is taken from 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics.   
The variables are constructed so as to avoid the non stationary.  The unit root test found 
that for all variables used we can reject the hypothesis of unit root.  Also since we are 
dealing with monthly data, seasonal unit root is also checked by using the methodology 
developed by Franses (1991), which is an extension of the HEGY test developed by 
Hylleberg, Engle, Granger, and Yoo (1990).  The result indicated that there is no seasonal 
unit root (See Table F and G).   
However, information contained in monthly data may be limited, owing to strong 
seasonal variation.  The presence of seasonal variation in the data can severely restrict 
firm conclusions about the interaction of variables.  The degree of seasonality in the data 
was examined by carrying out a simple F-test by regressing each variable on monthly 
seasonal dummies.  The null hypothesis implied no seasonality. (All coefficients of the 
seasonal dummies are simultaneously tested zero), while rejection of null implied the 
presence of seasonality in data.  The test strongly supports the null hypothesis of no 
seasonality in the data.  Therefore subsequent estimation will not contain seasonal 
dummies.   
V. Empirical Evidence 
This section first presents the results of the VAR regressions specified in the previous 
section and then analyze the impact on each of the model’s endogenous variables using 
impulse response functions.    
Estimation Results 
The VAR model was estimated by a standard ordinary least square (OLS) procedure, the 
results are shown in Table 2.  Lag length was selected as 1, using SBC information 
criteria.  This adjustment time, however, may be justified, because model only contains 
monetary variables that adjust relatively quickly.  The estimation yielded intuitively 
                                                 
18 Since it was not possible to obtain the monthly data for GDP, one could include monthly industrial 
production as the measure of real activity. Although this too has an issue; due to significant services sector 
in the economy, this approach of using industrial production would underestimate the true GDP. 
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appealing results.  Firstly, domestic credit was not found to be significantly affected by 
any of the variables in the model, except FR.  More specifically, foreign reserves were 
found to have significantly affected domestic credit. Sterilization was partial (sterilization 
coefficient = -0.501). As discussed in previous section that in some circumstances,  
the central bank may want both to resist currency appreciation and to ease its monetary 
stance. If so, intervention would create no conflict with monetary policy and hence no 
need to sterilize.  In case of Pakistan, after the gush of inflows in FY02, SBP sterilized 
heavily because of the fact that it had doubts regarding the persistence of these inflows.  
However, after it realized that inflows are mainly non-debt creating and that there is a 
Table 2: Full Sample (2001M1 to 2006M8) 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates  
 Included observations: 67 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 DC R ID 
DC(-1) -0.311349  0.163561 -1.342462 
  (0.16752)  (0.10469)  (2.01959) 
 [-1.85855] [ 1.56239] [-0.66472] 
R(-1) -0.500695  0.329985 -6.165821 
  (0.28973)  (0.18105)  (3.49286) 
 [-1.72816] [ 1.82258] [-1.76527] 
ID(-1)  0.004764 -0.004103  0.092073 
  (0.01055)  (0.00659)  (0.12720) 
 [ 0.45153] [-0.62232] [ 0.72387] 
C -0.018117  0.025599 -0.249970 
  (0.01691)  (0.01057)  (0.20389) 
 [-1.07126] [ 2.42222] [-1.22603] 
IF(-1) -0.015799 -0.021269  0.517493 
  (0.03813)  (0.02382)  (0.45962) 
 [-0.41440] [-0.89273] [ 1.12590] 
INF(-1)  0.003701 -0.002933  0.058245 
  (0.00262)  (0.00164)  (0.03155) 
 [ 1.41417] [-1.79349] [ 1.84621] 
CAM(-1) -0.248028  0.071430  4.112209 
  (0.19229)  (0.12017)  (2.31822) 
 [-1.28984] [ 0.59443] [ 1.77386] 
R-squared  0.192768  0.295580  0.327643 
Vector Diagnosis: 
Portmanteau 4 lags  28.39975 
Vector Normality Chi2  10.44958 
White hetroskedasticity (no cross term)  72.89367 
White hetroskedasticity (cross term)  174.1001 
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need to loosen up its monetary stance; it reduced its sterilization operation significantly in 
following years (see footnote 10).   
 
In addition the negative sign of CAM coefficient (-0.248) according to theory is correct 
which says ; that current account balance inflow results in the negative change in the 
domestic credit (DC); however remained insignificant.  This too is an evidence of the 
sterilization practice; albeit partial, undertaken by the State Bank of Pakistan. This result 
is in line with the stylized facts and anecdotes.  
The reserve equation also reveals interesting results.  The changes in foreign reserves 
following the changes in domestic credit are often used as a measure of monetary 
independence. There is a large degree of independence, when offset coefficient is close to 
zero given that only small proportion of a change in reserve money will be offset by  
balance of payment movement of capital flows.  Interestingly, the offset coefficient is 
very small and insignificant (0.16) implying that changes in credit resulted in almost 
insignificant offsetting reserve flows. It could also be an evidence of low capital mobility 
due to capital controls and the absence of capital account convertibility. Another 
explanation can be the low substitutability between Pakistani and foreign assets. It can 
also be augured that since majority of foreign exchange inflows were non-debt creating, 
the chances of changes in reserves in the presence of changes in domestic credit (DC) 
were minimal.   
A second, and related question, is to what extent foreign or internal factors pushed or 
pulled foreign capital to Pakistan, respectively. This question relates to the (Frankel 
1994) conclusion that unnecessarily high domestic interest rates will prevail when 
sterilization is undertaken in the case of an internal shock from higher domestic money 
demand or increase in exports (pull factor).  On the other hand, sterilization will be more 
appropriate when capital is pushed by some external shock.  Interestingly results show 
the insignificant coefficients of the domestic and foreign interest rates which imply that 
interest rates had not played any role in the foreign exchange inflows in Pakistan. That 
means inflows were neither pulled into the country due to high interest rates because of 
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some domestic policy,19 nor they are pushed into Pakistan due to low interest rates 
abroad.  Rather it supports the assertion that inflows were a result of an exogenous shock.  
It would seem that external factors played a crucial role in brining home these foreign 
exchange inflows. Most noteworthy was the big upsurge in workers’ remittances through 
official channels that resulted from the global crack down on illegal channels of money 
transfer. This led to the collapse of Hundi system and demise of kerb market premium 
over official rate. Another contributing factor was the reverse capital flight as the 
balances of Pakistani’s came under scrutiny abroad.  In addition, debt rescheduling and 
new large aid inflows to Pakistan for siding with US and its allies in the war against 
terrorism augmented the net inflows.  Moreover the coefficient of lag of current account 
balance CAM (0.07) in reserve equation has plausible sign and but is insignificant.  
The results of domestic interest rate equation too have some interesting points.  The 
coefficient of reserves (-6.17) in this equation is significant and has plausible sign. It 
reflects on the fact that sterilization of foreign exchange intervention was not complete 
and that had exerted negative pressures on the domestic interest rates.  This was in line 
with the anecdotes.20 The coefficient of inflation in domestic interest rate equation is very 
low (0.058245), however it is significant and has conceivable sign.  Inflation remained 
subdued till end 2004 and only surfaced afterwards.  SBP tightened its monetary policy 
only after mid 2005.  This perhaps explain small coefficient size if inflation in domestic 
interest rate equation. Vector Diagnosis reveals that all assumptions regarding the error 
term were met.   
We also estimated same model for two sub samples.  Break date is taken as March 2004 
on the basis of the fact that inflation started accelerating after this date.  Therefore sub-
                                                 
19 Frankel (1994) argues that inflows could be the result of a increase in domestic money demand after 
some kind of stabilization program.  Although Pakistan at that time was under IMF’s stabilization program, 
yet we found no evidence of this connection. 
20 As the governor of the SBP stated in March 2004 in his paper presented in Pakistan Administrative Staff 
College “Despite some mopping up, the Central Bank has left excess liquidity with the banks which has 
driven down the cost of credit to historically low levels of 5 percent average. The banks are, therefore, 
reaching out to new customers particularly the middle and lower income groups by providing them 
agriculture credit, SME loans, mortgage loans and consumer loans. This is the most direct way the reserve 
accumulation is benefiting the common man….”20 
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sample one represents the low inflation period while sub-sample two represents when the 
State Bank of Pakistan encountered inflation threat and tightened its monetary stance.  
Table 3 represents results regarding sub-sample one.  Sterilization is almost 66% which 
is more than the full sample estimate and in line with our expectation. In addition to this 
the negative sign of CAM coefficient (-0.628) is correct and significant.  
Contrary to the full sample, the offset coefficient although very small (0.253) but is 
insignificant, implying that changes in credit resulted in very small offsetting reserve 
flows. The results of domestic interest rate equation too have some interesting points.  
The coefficient of reserves (-11.331) in this equation is significant and has plausible sign. 
Table 3: Sub-Sample 1 (2001M01 to 2004M03) 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates  
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 DC FR ID 
DC(-1) -0.513300  0.253115 -1.513182 
  (0.19104)  (0.12350)  (2.56506) 
 [-2.68693] [ 2.04952] [-0.58992] 
FR(-1) -0.665530  0.567175 -11.33087 
  (0.31063)  (0.20082)  (4.17092) 
 [-2.14249] [ 2.82435] [-2.71663] 
ID(-1)  0.005347 -0.006203  0.068718 
  (0.01104)  (0.00713)  (0.14819) 
 [ 0.48447] [-0.86939] [ 0.46371] 
IF(-1) -0.026825 -0.031151  0.686114 
  (0.04120)  (0.02663)  (0.55314) 
 [-0.65115] [-1.16970] [ 1.24040] 
INF(-1) -0.001227  0.002464  0.032997 
  (0.00229)  (0.00148)  (0.03070) 
 [-0.53657] [ 1.66684] [ 1.07488] 
CAM(-1) -0.627931  0.119317  7.997240 
  (0.26523)  (0.17147)  (3.56132) 
 [-2.36746] [ 0.69586] [ 2.24558] 
 R-squared  0.265868  0.207706  0.266033 
Vector Diagnosis:  
Portmanteau 4 lags  26.77141 
Vector Normality Chi2  8.602368 
White hetroskedasticity (no cross term)  72.10327 
White hetroskedasticity (cross term)  155.8985 
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It reflects on the fact that sterilization was only partial and that had exerted negative 
pressures on the domestic interest rates. This was also evident from unprecedented fall in 
bench mark 6-Month Treasury bill rates from 10.96 at the start of the sample to 1.74 by 
the end of the sample period.   
Table 4 represents the results of the high inflation sample period. The sign of sterilization 
coefficient (-0.105) is true, but it turned out to be statistically insignificant.  However, this 
was consistent with the overall monetary stance of the central bank. From April 2004 
onwards, almost all the intervention by the State Bank of Pakistan in the forex market 
Table 4: Sub-Sample 2 (2004M04 to 2006M08) 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates  
 Included observations: 29  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 DC FR ID 
DC(-1)  0.324633 -0.146249  1.875059 
  (0.32683)  (0.23520)  (2.57829) 
 [ 0.99328] [-0.62180] [ 0.72725] 
FR(-1) -0.104731 -0.041484  7.177507 
  (0.52389)  (0.37702)  (4.13291) 
 [-0.19991] [-0.11003] [ 1.73667] 
ID(-1)  0.017699 -0.013937  0.386944 
  (0.02640)  (0.01900)  (0.20826) 
 [ 0.67043] [-0.73360] [ 1.85801] 
C  0.008347  0.002607 -0.894786 
  (0.05917)  (0.04258)  (0.46677) 
 [ 0.14107] [ 0.06123] [-1.91698] 
IF(-1)  0.002665 -0.004771  2.127052 
  (0.09916)  (0.07136)  (0.78227) 
 [ 0.02687] [-0.06686] [ 2.71909] 
INF(-1) -0.000484  0.000109  0.103263 
  (0.00731)  (0.00526)  (0.05766) 
 [-0.06618] [ 0.02076] [ 1.79101] 
CAM(-1)  0.158100  0.003674 -0.318915 
  (0.23576)  (0.16966)  (1.85983) 
 [ 0.67061] [ 0.02166] [-0.17148] 
R-squared  0.158728  0.073261  0.514652 
Vector Diagnosis:  
Portmanteau 4 lags  29.71896 
Vector Normality Chi2  9.268957 
White hetroskedasticity (no cross term)  65.67934 
White hetroskedasticity (cross term)  161.9859 
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was in the form of net sales to support the exchange rate (see Figure 3). However, SBP 
not sterilizing its forex intervention was also consistent with its tight monetary stance 
during this period due to inflation concern21.  With almost no sterilization, the 
insignificant offset coefficient (-0.1462) is close to zero reflecting almost complete 
independence of monetary policy conduct from the balance of payment concerns.  The 
results of domestic interest rate equation too have some interesting points.  The 
coefficient of reserves (7.177) in this equation is significant and has plausible sign. It 
reflects on the fact of tight monetary stance in the period. Inflation too have impacted the 
domestic interest rates by jacking them up.  
The VAR can be used to analyze the impact of shocks to its endogenous variables on 
other variables in the system using impulse response analysis. The impulse response 
function traces the effect of a one standard deviation (OSD) innovation in the endogenous 
variables to current and future values of all endogenous variables. Figure 4 shows the 
impulse responses for the full sample data.  
A shock in domestic credit levels leads to an immediate reduction in domestic interest 
rates, followed by a converging toward zero in the remaining four months (the first 
column of graphs). In terms of reserves, a tighter credit policy is followed by a surge in 
capital inflows, albeit of smaller magnitude. 
The impact of a shock to foreign reserves on domestic interest rates causes a significant 
reduction in interest rates initially. This perhaps indicates partial sterilization and 
resulting intentional gush of liquidity in the market following the interventions. Impact of 
shock of foreign reserves on domestic credit levels too show a fall of domestic credit 
(graphs in first and third row of the second column). As previously found, the empirical 
analysis finds support for the sterilization bias hypothesis. 
The impact of a shock to domestic interest rates on foreign reserves and domestic credit 
is relatively insignificant. More importantly, this confirms the previous results that flows 
were not a result of domestic interest rates. 
 
                                                 
21 The bench mark 6-Month treasury bill rate rose from 1.84 percent at the start of the period to 8.81 
percent by the end of the sample period. 
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VI. Conclusion:  
This paper analyzed three empirical questions. The first question is to what extent 
monetary authority maintained monetary independence in its attempt to insulate the 
money supply from the surge in foreign exchange inflows during the period under 
consideration.  This question is examined by estimating the offset coefficient.  
Interestingly, the offset coefficient for full sample is very small and insignificant (0.16) 
implying that changes in credit resulted in very minimal offsetting reserve flows. It is 
also an evidence of low capital mobility in the absence of capital account convertibility. 
Another explanation can be the low substitutability between Pakistani and foreign assets.  
It can also be argued that since majority of foreign exchange inflows were non-debt 
Figure 4: Impulse Response Function (Full Sample)
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creating, the chances of changes in reserves in the presence of changes in domestic credit 
(DC) were minimal.  
We also analyzed was the sterilization policy of SBP.  We found out that for the full 
sample period, SBP only partially sterilized the inflows.  Generally, the central bank 
would want both to resist currency appreciation and to control inflationary pressures. If 
so, foreign exchange intervention would be in direct conflict with monetary policy of the 
country and the monetary authorities will find it harder to prevent appreciation pressure 
while at the same time raising the interest rate. Thus, a first challenge the monetary 
authority faces is to coordinate intervention with monetary policy. However, in case of 
Pakistan, the economy was very slow and the inflationary pressures were almost absent at 
the beginning of the period under study. Thus SBP resorted to expansionary monetary 
policy.  For this reason, foreign exchange intervention need not be sterilized fully (only 
50 percent). This resulted in gush of liquidity in market and interest rates in fact dipped.  
This is also in accord with the [Frankel( 1994)] conclusion that unnecessarily high 
domestic interest rates will prevail when sterilization is undertaken in the case of an 
internal shock such as higher domestic money demand or increase in exports (pull factor).  
On the other hand, sterilization will be more appropriate when capital is pushed by some 
external shock. Interestingly results show the insignificant coefficients of the domestic 
and foreign interest rates which imply that interest rates had not played any role in the 
foreign exchange inflows in Pakistan. That mean inflows were neither pulled into the 
country due to some domestic policy, interest rates nor they are pushed into Pakistan due 
to low interest rates abroad.  Rather it supports the assertion that inflows were a result of 
an exogenous shock i.e, September 11, 2001.  It would seem that external factors played 
a crucial role in brining home these foreign exchange inflows. Most noteworthy was the 
big upsurge in workers’ remittances through official channels that resulted from the 
global crack down on illegal channels of money transfer.  
The analyses of sub-samples show that there was no sterilization done post April 2004 
period.  This was because of the fact that during that period SBP intervened in the forex 
market as a net seller, and with the need of tightening of monetary policy arising out of 
inflationary pressures, no sterilization policy was in full agreement with tight monetary 
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policy.  Hence we can argue that during the period under study, SBP’s domestic credit 
policy was in no conflict with its intervention in forex market.    
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Appendix 
 
Demand for base money  
(1)   ( , , , )DM L Y W id if=  where , 0; , 0y w id ifL L L L> <  
Net domestic demand for domestic bonds 
(2)  ( , , , )DB H Y W id if=  where , 0; 0; 0id w if yH H H H> < ><  
Domestic demand for foreign bonds 
(3)  ( , , , )FB J Y W id if= where , 0; 0; 0if w id yJ J J J> < ><  
Net foreign demand for domestic bonds 
(4)  * * *( , , , )DB F Y W id if=  where * *0, 0, , 0id if w yH H H H> < ><  
Total money supply 
(5)  NDANFAM s +=  
Domestic component of money supply 
(6)  GBNDA Δ−=Δ which represents open market operation 
Foreign components of money supply 
(7)  CABKNFA +=Δ  
Total net capital inflows 
(8)  FD BBK Δ−Δ= *  
Domestic wealth constraint 
(9)  WJHL =++ (...)(...)(...)  
Money equilibrium 
(10)  sD MM =  
Domestic bond equilibrium 
(11)  GDD BBB =+ *  
 
The model can be solved for changes in domestic interest rates and changes in net foreign 
assets (NFA) of the central bank.  
 
Using the money equilibrium equation (10), we have 
( , , , )NFA NDA L Y W id if+ =  
(12)  ( , , , )NFA NDA L Y W id ifΔ + Δ = Δ  
using (7), we get 
(13)  ( , , , )K CAB NDA L Y W id if+ + Δ = Δ  
Also   CABKNFA +=Δ  
  * *( , , , ) ( , , , )NFA F Y W id if J Y W id if CABΔ = Δ − Δ +  by using (8). 
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(14)  * *
* *( ) (
)
id if y wy w
id if
NFA F Y F W F id F if J Y J W
J id J if CAB
Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ − Δ + Δ +
Δ + Δ +
 
Again utilizing (12) 
  y w id ifNFA NDA L Y L W L id L ifΔ + Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ  
substituting (14), we get         
  
* *
* *( ) (
)
id if y wy w
id if y w
id if
F Y F W F id F if J Y J W
J id J if CAB NDA L Y L W
L id L if
Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ − Δ + Δ
+ Δ + Δ + + Δ = Δ + Δ
+ Δ + Δ
 
* *
* *
( )
( )
id id id if
if if y wy w
F J id L id L Y L W L if NDA
F J if F Y F W J Y J W CAB
− Δ − Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ − Δ −
− Δ − Δ − Δ + Δ + Δ −  
(15)  
* *
* *
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
id id id y y w w
if if if y w
F J L id L J Y L J W
L F J if NDA F Y F W CAB
− − Δ = + Δ + + Δ +
− + Δ − Δ − Δ − Δ −  
Invoking wealth constraint (9), we have 
  1=++ www JHL  
 and 0=++ aaa JHL  where , ,a Y id if=  
 
Therefore (15) implies 
  
* *
* *
( ) (1 ) ( )
yid id w if if
y w
F H id H Y H W F H if
NDA F Y F W CAB
+ Δ = − Δ + − Δ − + Δ −
Δ − Δ − Δ −  
(16)  
* *
* *
1 { ( )
( )
}
y w if if
id id
y w
id H Y H W F H if
F H
NDA F Y F W CAB
Δ = − Δ + Δ + + Δ ++
Δ + Δ + Δ +
 
 
Again using (12) 
  ( , , , )NFA L Y W id if NDAΔ = Δ − Δ  
  *y w i iNFA L Y L W L id L if NDAΔ = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ − Δ  
substituting (16), we have         
  
* *
* *
1[
( )
{ ( )
}]
y w if id
id id
y w if if
y w
NFA L Y L W L if NDA L
F H
H Y H W F H if NDA
F Y F W CAB
Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ − Δ + − +
Δ + Δ + + Δ + Δ +
Δ + Δ +
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* *
* *
[ ] [ ]
( ) ( )
( )
[ ] [1
( ) ( )
1[ { }]
( )
id y id w
y w
id id id id
id if if id
if
id id id id
id y w
id id
L H L HNFA L Y L W
F H F H
L F H LL if NDA
F H F H
L F Y F W CAB
F H
Δ = − Δ + − Δ+ +
−+ − Δ − + Δ ++ +
− Δ + Δ ++
 
 
Again invoking wealth constraint (9), we have 
  1=++ www JHL  
 and 0=++ aaa JHL  where , ,a Y id if=  
By utilizing these in previous equation, we have 
(17)  
* *
* *
1[ { ( ) }]
( )
1[ { ( ) }]
( )
1[ { ( ) ( }]
( )
1[ ( )]
( )
1[ { }]
( )
y id id id y
id id
w id id id w
id id
if id id id if if
id id
id id
id id
id id idy w
id id
NFA L J F L J Y
F H
L J F L J W
F H
L J F L F J if
F H
F J NDA
F H
L F Y L F W L CAB
F H
Δ = − − − Δ ++
− − − Δ ++
− − + − Δ+
− − Δ ++
− Δ + Δ ++
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Table A: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 
  FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 
 Growth rates 
Real GDP (fc)1 3.5 4.2 3.9 2.5 3.6 5.1 6.4 8.4 
Agriculture 4.5 1.9 6.1 -2.6 1.4 4.1 2.6 7.5 
Major crops 8.3 0 15.4 -9.8 -0.5 5.8 2.8 17.3 
Manufacturing 6.9 4.1 1.5 7.6 4.4 7.7 13.4 12.5 
Large-scale 7.6 3.6 0 8.6 4 8.7 17.1 15.6 
Services sector 1.6 5 4.2 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.2 7.9 
         
Consumer price index (FY01=100) 7.8 5.7 3.6 4.4 3.5 3.1 4.6 9.3 
         
Sensitive price indicator (FY01=100) 7.4 6.4 1.8 4.8 3.4 3.5 6.8 11.6 
         
Domestic credit 15 3.5 9 3.7 2.4 0.6 23.7 22.4 
Monetary assets (M2) 14.5 6.2 9.4 9 14.8 18 19.6 19.3 
Exports (f.o.b.) 3.7 -9.8 10.1 7.4 -0.7 22.2 10.3 16.9 
Imports (f.o.b.) -15 -6.8 9.3 4.1 -3.6 17.8 27.6 32.3 
Liquid foreign exchange reserves with SBP2  930.0 1,729.7 1,352.3 2,075.8 4,804.9 9,993.0 11,107.0 10,481.0 
(million US Dollar)         
 As percent of GDP 
Total investment 17.7 15.6 17.4 17.2 16.8 16.9 17.3 16.8 
National savings 14.7 11.7 15.8 16.5 18.6 20.8 18.7 15.1 
Tax revenue 13.2 13.3 12.9 10.6 10.9 11.5 11 10.1 
Total revenue 16 15.9 16.3 13.3 14.2 14.9 14.3 13.7 
Budgetary expenditure 23.7 22 22.5 17.2 18.8 18.6 17.3 18.3 
Budgetary deficit 7.7 6.1 6.6 4.3 4.3 3.7 3 3.3 
         
Current account deficit -2.7 -3.8 -0.3 0.5 4 4.9 1.9 -1.4 
(Including official transfers)         
         
Domestic debt 43.9 47.4 41.6 41.6 39 38.4 35.8 32.5 
External debt 55.4 54.9 44.4 49.5 45.6 40 35 31 
Explicit liabilities3 0.5 2.4 2 2.3 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.4 
Total debt (Including external liabilities) 99.8 104.7 88 93.3 85.9 79.3 71.4 63.9 
1 During FY02, sectoral shares in GDP were as follows: agriculture (24.1 percent), industry (25.0 percent) and services (50.9 percent). 
2 Foreign exchange reserves for FY99 and FY00 include FE-13 deposits with SBP, whereas for FY01 and FY02, these include 
CRR/SLR on FE-25 deposits.   
3 Explicit liabilities include Special US Dollar bonds, FEBCs, FCBCs and DBCs.    
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Table B: Balance of Payment 
  
Balance on goods, 
services and private 
transfers* 
Balance on capital 
account* 
Balance on capital 
account plus errors and 
omission* Overall Balance** 
FY92 -1346 1510 1476 130 
FY93 -3688 3073 3099 -589 
FY94 -1965 3471 3550 1585 
FY95 -2484 2797 2722 238 
FY96 -4575 4195 4144 -431 
FY97 -3846 2748 2814 -1032 
FY98 -1921 1268 1615 -306 
FY99 -2819 -1315 -323 -3142 
FY00 -1931 -2464 -1963 -3894 
FY01 -513 196 822 309 
FY02 1338 388 1316 2654 
FY03 3028 1113 1561 4589 
FY04 1300 -823 -601 699 
FY05 -1807 816 736 -1071 
FY06 -5683 6576 6576 1132 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan    
*A minus sign indicate a deficit in the pertinent account.  Balance on goods, services and private transfers are equal to the current 
account balance minus official transfers.  The latter are treated in this table as external financing and are included in the capital 
account. 
**Overall balance equals the sum of row 2 and 4.  A positive entry indicates the accumulation of international reserves by monetary 
authority.   
 
Table C: External cash flow Position 
million UD Dollar        
    FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 
Researves at the beginning of the year+ 1,740 2,163 3,244 6,398 11,667 12,389 12,621 
Inflows*  16,845 20,020 22,228 25,239 25,623 32,556 40,508 
of which         
 Exports 8,190 8,933 9,140 10,974 12,459 14,482 16,506 
 Services 1,501 1,367 1,929 2,712 2,644 3,319 3,748 
 Remittences 983 1,087 2,390 4,237 3,871 4,168 4,600 
 Kerb purchases 1,634 2,157 1,376 0 0 0 0 
 Foreign investment 546 146 358 607 1,179 1,852 3,132 
 Official grants 940 844 1,500 1,051 619 391 865 
 Loan disbursments 1,588 2,740 2,910 2,208 1,726 2,438 2,782 
 Exceptional financing 3,965 692 138 620 221 -7 239 
Outflow*  17,227 18,939 19,074 19,970 24,901 32,324 39,832 
of which         
 Imports 9,598 10,202 9,434 11,333 13,738 18,996 24,948 
 Services 2,766 2,332 2,214 2,714 3,960 6,612 8,150 
 Interest payments 1,596 1,369 1,111 976 1,056 1,037 1,233 
 Amortization 1,828 1,714 1,551 1,231 3,089 1,339 1,202 
  Repayment of liabilities 652 1,940 3,590 1,192 392 154 461 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan        
*only major heads are included        
+ Reserves comprises SBP forex Reserves and Reserves with the banks    
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Table D: Financial Account 
million US Dollar             
 Items FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 
Financial account -1,114 -2,423 -471 -1,335 446 5,855 
1. Direct investment abroad -37 -2 -27 -45 -66 -70 
2. Direct investment in Pakistan 323 485 798 951 1,525 3,521 
3. Portfolio investment -140 -491 -239 314 620 985 
4. Other investment -1,260 -1,932 -1,003 -2,555 -1,633 1,419 
Source: Statistics Department, SBP             
 
Table E : Cash Reserves Requirements (CRR) 
With effect from Rate  as % of Time and Demand Liabilities 
19-Jan-68 5 
24-Oct-91 5 
15-Jan-92 5 
9-Feb-95 5 
18-Jul-95 5 
19-Dec-95 5 
1-Jul-96 5 
26-Jul-97 5 
22-Jun-98 3.75 on Rupee and 5 on Foreign Currency   
5-Sep-98 5 
19-May-99 3.5 
12-Jul-99 5 
7-Oct-00 7 
16-Dec-00 5 
30-Dec-00 5 
5-Jan-01 5 
22-Jul-06 7 of Demand Liabilities and 3 of Time Liabilities# 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan 
 
Table F: Unit Root Testing 
    ADF   Conclusion 
1 DC -8.857968 [0] No unit root 
2 R -4.044513 [3] No unit root 
3 ID -4.310869 [1] No unit root 
4 IF -4.450789 [3] No unit root 
5 INF -4.459543 [10] No unit root 
6 CAM -6.958482 [6] No unit root 
Critical value at 5 percent significance level is -3.478 for ADF test 
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Table G: Monthly seasonal unit root testing [Franses (1990)]    
    FR DC ID IF INF CAM 
Π1 t-test -1.580106 -1.967853 -1.433631 -2.28186 -3.011124 -3.193934 
        
Π2 to Π12 Joint F-test 7.497773 3.277999 10.30495 20.13872 86.2958 4.266772 
  Probability 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
Note: critical t value for Π1 with trend at 5% and 10 % are -3.34 and -2.92 respectively.   
 
